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Abstract 
 We introduce banks in a model of money and capital with trading frictions.  Banks offer demand 
deposit contracts and hold primary assets to maximize depositors’ utility.  If banks’ operating 
costs are small, banks reallocate liquidity eliminating idle balances and improving the allocation.  
At moderate costs, idle balances are reduced but not eliminated.  At larger costs, banks are 
redundant.  A central bank policy of paying interest on bank reserves can reverse inflation’s 
distortionary effects, and increase welfare, but only when costs are small.  The threshold levels 
of banks’ costs increase with inflation, suggesting inflation and banks’ utilization are positively 
associated. 
JEL classification: E41; E50 
Keywords: Money; Credit; Banking; Monetary Policy 
 2 
1   Introduction 
This paper introduces banks into a model of money and capital based on Lagos and Wright 
(2005) and Aruoba and Wright (2003).  Banks have a natural role to play in this model because 
money balances not used in transactions carry an opportunity cost.  But because agents 
experience random shocks to trading opportunities and preferences, the value of money balances 
is heterogeneous and potentially very large.  Therefore, as long as bank operating costs 
(transaction costs) are not too large, banks improve the return on saving and increase welfare, by 
pooling agents’ deposits in order to provide liquidity insurance.  
 Of course, there is a long literature starting with Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
investigating this role of banks in various monetary models; see Bencivenga and Smith (2003) 
for references. The novel aspect here is an analysis of liquidity insurance in a setting in which 
money has a role to play due to the structure of markets and of information, and banks cannot 
obviate the role of money by reallocating deposits of the consumption good.2  In this setting, 
banks can improve welfare if the resource costs of operating banks are not too big, and if 
inflation is not too high relative to these costs.  However, banks cannot always achieve rates of 
return on deposits that are socially optimal.  Under some circumstances, a central bank policy of 
paying interest on bank reserves may improve welfare further, although not to the level attained 
by a social planner. 
 When choosing their portfolio of assets in the centralized market (the second of two 
markets opening sequentially each period), agents view the illiquid investment technology 
(capital formation) as an alternative to money for transforming current consumption into 
consumption in the next centralized market.  The return on this investment is, in general, higher 
than the rate of return on money.  However, the value of money balances is random when agents 
 3 
choose their portfolio, as a result of shocks to both trading opportunities and the marginal utility 
of consumption, which are realized in the intervening decentralized market, and which are 
independent across agents and over time.  Faced with random liquidity needs, it may be welfare-
improving for agents to create a third instrument for saving in the centralized market—agents 
may form coalitions (banks) that accept deposits of the consumption good, and hold the portfolio 
of money and capital investment that maximizes expected utility of depositors. 3 
 When (banks’) operating costs are small, banks improve the allocation, by making it 
unnecessary for agents to carry money into the decentralized market.  Banks hold the entire 
money supply as reserves, to meet withdrawal demand of buyers who engage in decentralized 
trade, and they hold remaining assets in the form of investment in capital, to benefit depositors 
who withdraw in the next centralized market (residual claimants).  As in Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983), banks eliminate idle money balances.   In such an equilibrium, a policy of interest on 
reserves improves welfare even further.  If lump-sum taxes are feasible, then the central bank can 
implement the Friedman rule by paying interest on reserves, which allows efficient decentralized 
trades (although there is a distortion in the centralized market, due to banks’ operating costs, and 
therefore a slight departure from the allocation at the Friedman rule). 
 At higher levels of operating costs, banks improve the allocation, but by less.  There is a 
threshold level of costs, which depends on the inflation rate, above which banks reduce, but do 
not eliminate, idle money balances—only the most liquidity-constrained buyers optimally incur 
the costs of bank services.  Once costs pass this threshold, a policy of interest on reserves does 
not improve welfare.  When operating costs are even higher relative to inflation, the value to 
agents of this limited reduction in idle money balances is too small to justify the costs.  Above 
this second threshold, banks are redundant, and the equilibrium is as in Aruoba and Wright 
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(2003).  In this model, the usefulness of banks—the value to agents of pooling their saving, in 
order to create bank deposits as an additional financial asset—is an endogenous outcome, 
dependent on the capital stock and the price level, as well as transaction costs, the money growth 
rate, and the distributions of trading opportunities and the marginal utility of consumption in 
decentralized trade, i.e., on the distribution of liquidity needs. 
 As is standard in many representative-agent monetary models, the allocation without 
banks is efficient when nominal interest rates are zero, so there is scope for Diamond-Dybvig 
banks to increase welfare only when nominal interest rates are positive, and banks cannot restore 
full efficiency.  Banks can reallocate liquidity across depositors, but because money is used to 
carry out decentralized trade, buyers making withdrawals for this purpose demand redemptions 
in money, which constrains banks to hold reserves that are subject to the inflation tax.  
Therefore, the higher the inflation rate, the larger are the threshold levels of bank operating costs 
that at first, prevent banks from completely eliminating idle money balances, and then make 
banks redundant. 
 These results suggest that when enforcement problems are severe (which limits loans), as 
in developing countries with weak legal systems, we should see heavy utilization of banks in 
high-inflation environments.  At lower inflation rates, much smaller costs would be predicted to 
render the liquidity provided by banks too expensive to be utilized.  In a developing country 
context, relevant costs include costs of accessing banks, such as the time needed to visit a bank 
branch (time away from work), as well as costs of maintaining a network of bank branches.  For 
example, this model can explain why bank services were large relative to GDP in Brazil even 
during its years of acute inflation, while in India, it has taken decades for banks to penetrate rural 
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villages, even though inflation has been much lower.  In general, we should observe a positive 
correlation between utilization of banks and inflation.   
 In an equilibrium in which agents do not carry money into the decentralized market, a 
policy of paying interest on reserves (or equivalently, allowing banks to hold reserves in the form 
of interest-bearing government debt) is an incentive-compatible way for the central bank to give 
money injections only to those agents with immediate liquidity needs.  This mechanism breaks 
down when banks’ operating costs are sufficiently large that all agents hold precautionary money 
balances.  The threshold level of costs is increasing in the inflation rate.  Thus, this model 
suggests that in low-cost environments, we should observe the central bank paying interest on 
reserves only at low inflation rates.  For various reasons, we would expect bank operating costs 
to be larger in developing countries, suggesting we might see central banks paying interest on 
reserves even at higher inflation rates.  However, government reliance on seigniorage is not 
modeled here, and that motive for inflation would suggest high reserve requirements and zero or 
low interest rates paid on reserves, in order to permit a budget deficit to be financed at the lowest 
possible inflation rate. 
 Another policy implication of the model concerns currency unions.  A currency union can 
be thought of as a coalition of agents committed to harmonizing their financial policies in order 
to improve agents’ access to liquidity.  If financial integration involves substantial resource 
costs, our results suggest that a currency union might be socially desirable only for coalitions of 
high-inflation countries.  In this respect, our analysis mirrors some of the concerns of Kiyotaki 
and Moore (2002), who demonstrate that a currency union can lead to too little specialization, 
and an inferior allocation of consumption. 
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 Section 2 of the paper describes the environment.   Section 3 presents the solution to the 
planner’s problem.  Sections 4 and 5 solve agents’ problems and partially characterize stationary 
equilibrium.  Section 6 sets up the case where banks are redundant because transaction costs are 
large.  Section 7 analyzes the allocative effects and welfare benefits of banks arising when costs 
are zero or small.  Section 8 analyzes central bank policy of paying interest on reserves.  Section 
9 discusses the case of moderate costs, when banks improve welfare, but an interest-on-reserves 
policy would yield no further improvement.  Section 10 concludes. 
2  Environment 
The model is based on Lagos and Wright (2005).  Time is discrete, and indexed t = 0, 1, …  Each 
period, two markets open in sequence.  In the decentralized market (market 1), agents experience 
bilateral matches in which a perishable “specialized good” is produced and consumed.  Labor is 
the sole factor of production of the specialized good.  All agents meet and trade in the centralized 
market (market 2), in which a nonstorable “general good” is produced, consumed, and invested 
in capital formation.  The general good is produced using capital and labor, as in Aruoba and 
Wright (2003). 
 At the start of each date, agents are identical.  Upon entering market 1, each agent 
becomes a buyer or a seller, or is idle, and each buyer has either high or low marginal utility of 
consumption, as a result of a “type” shock.  Realizations of agents’ type shocks are independent 
across agents and over time.  Every buyer is in a bilateral match with a seller.  
 The two primary assets are fiat money and capital.  Capital is produced using an 
investment technology; one unit of the general good invested in market 2 on date 1t  yields one 
unit of capital at the beginning of market 2 on date t.  The central bank changes the money 
supply at an exogenous, constant rate via lump-sum money transfers to agents. 
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 Transactions in market 1 require money.4  The type shock causes heterogeneity in agents’ 
liquidity needs in market 1, and therefore it is a liquidity shock.  Agents faced with random 
liquidity needs would like to pool their saving at the end of date t – 1, in order to reduce unused 
money balances in market 1 of date t, and increase investment, which has a higher yield.  Our 
environment allows agents to deposit their saving in banks in market 2 of date t – 1, and then pay 
a fixed cost to withdraw money from their deposit in market 1 on date t, once their type shock 
is realized.  Remaining deposits are paid out in market 2 of date t, in the general good. Thus a 
bank is a coalition of agents that offers demand deposit contracts, and invests deposits in the 
primary assets to maximize expected utility of depositors.  Banks’ potential to improve welfare 
derives from their ability to reallocate liquidity and improve the composition of aggregate 
saving.5  In this model, banks do not make loans because, by assumption, they cannot solve the 
enforcement problems that arise in recovering loans. 
 In market 2, investment undertaken on the previous date yields capital.  Competitive 
firms employ capital and labor to produce the general good according to a neoclassical 
technology.  Capital fully depreciates during use.  Agents supply labor, earn wage income, and 
receive interest income on their existing deposits.  Banks rent capital to firms and pay depositors 
in market 2 out of capital income.  Equivalently, depositors are paid in capital, which is then 
rented to firms. 
 We use subscripts to indicate the date, and whether the agent is a buyer, a seller, or idle 
(b, s, or n), in market 1.  An additional subscript indicates the market (1 or 2).  A superscript 
indicates whether the agent’s match in market 1 involves a buyer with low or high marginal 
utility of consumption (L, H).  For example, Lsth2  gives hours worked in market 2 on date t by an 
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agent who was a seller in market 1, in a match with a low marginal utility buyer.  When possible, 
subscripts and superscripts are omitted. 
2.A  Market 1 
In market 1, an agent is matched with probability , and is idle otherwise.  A matched agent is 
equally likely to be a buyer or a seller.  A buyer derives utility  xui  from consuming x  units 
of specialized goods, where i  ( HLi , ) is the marginal utility component of the type shock, 
which is observable by the seller.  Assume LH   , and Hi    with probability  .  The 
notation  H  and  1L  will be convenient.  The function u satisfies the Inada 
conditions.  A seller can produce h units of specialized goods by working h hours, at utility 
cost  hc , where   00 c , and c', c'' > 0.  Letting ith1  denote the output of a seller matched with a 
buyer of type i in market 1 on date t, market-clearing requires it
i
t xh 11  .  An idle agent can neither 
produce nor consume. 
 We will study the model in real terms, dividing nominal magnitudes on date t by the price 
level in market 2, denoted tp2 .  The expected value of entering market 1 on date t with real 
money balances ttt pMm 2/  and real bank deposit ttt pDd 2/  is given by 
 
               


HLi
i
st
i
st
i
bt
i
bt
i
t
i
t
ii
ntnttt dmWdmWhcxudmWdmV
,
11 ,,2
,1,   
where  ijtijt dmW ,  is the value of carrying real money balances ijtm  and real deposit ijtd  into 
market 2 ( bsnj ,,  and HLi , ).  We conjecture (and later verify) that agents optimally enter 
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the period with the same portfolio of money and deposits ( tm  and td ), due to quasi-linear 
preferences in market 2. 
 Agents can withdraw money from their bank deposit in market 1, but if they do, a real 
transaction cost   is deducted from their deposit.  Let tr1  and tr2  denote the real interest rates 
paid by banks on withdrawals in markets 1 and 2 on date t.  Under the conjecture that in 
equilibrium tt rr 12  , only buyers make withdrawals.  A buyer’s budget constraint in market 1 is 
(1)    ttitt
t
i
t
i
t rdgm
p
xp
1
2
11 1    HLi ,  
where itp1  is the price of specialized goods in transactions involving buyers of type i ( HLi , ), 
and itg  denotes the proportion of buyer i’s deposit, net of the fixed cost, that is withdrawn, i.e.,  
(2)  10  itg      HLi , . 
Buyers and sellers are price takers.  Buyers choose itx1  and
i
tg , and sellers choose
i
th1 , to 
maximize  tt dmV , .  Money balances carried into market 2 are given by 
(3)  
   t
t
i
t
i
t
tt
i
tt
i
bt
t
t
i
t
i
t
t
i
st
ttnt
p
xp
rdgmm
p
xp
mm
mm






2
11
1
2
11
1
  HLi , ; bsnj ,,  
where t  is a real money transfer received (or paid) in market 2.  Deposits are given by 
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(4)      ittitibt
t
i
stnt
dgd
ddd


1
 
where the indicator function it  “rebates” the transaction cost to buyers who choose not to 
withdraw money in market 1 ( 1it  if 0
i
tg , and equals zero otherwise). 
2.B  Market 2 
 At the start of market 2 on date t, each agent is indexed by the realization of his shock in market 
1, and if he was a seller, the buyer’s marginal utility.  Preferences are   i jti jt hxU 22  , where i jtx2  
is consumption of the general good, and i jth2  is hours worked at the real wage rate tw , sbnj ,, , 
and HLi , .  The function U satisfies the Inada conditions. 
 Expected lifetime utility from entering market 2 with real balances jitm  and real deposit 
j
itd  is  
       1122 ,,  tti jti jtijtijt dmVhxUdmW   . 
Agents choose non-negative values i jtx2 , 
i
jth2 , 1tm , and 1td  to maximize W subject to the 
nominal budget constraint 
   tijttijti jttti jttttt rdpMhwpxpdpM 222222121 1   . 
 11 
The left-hand side gives consumption of the general good, plus saving in the form of money and 
deposits of the general good.  The right-hand side gives wage income, plus money balances and 
deposits (including interest earned).  Divide by tp2 , and use
t
t
t p
p
2
1,2
1

  , to obtain 
(5)  
 
t
t
i
jt
i
jt
i
jtttti
jt w
rdmxdm
h
22111
2
1
 

 . 
From this point on we assume 02 
i
jth ; this means assuming  2xU   is sufficiently large that 
even the wealthiest agents in market 2 choose to work. 
2.C  Banks 
 On each date t, banks offer a one-period deposit contract consisting of real net interest rates 
1,1 tr  and 1,2 tr  to be paid on withdrawals of money in market 1, and the general good in 
market 2, on date 1t .6  Banks cannot observe realizations of agents’ shocks, and therefore, 
1,1 tr  and 1,2 tr  are not contingent on the agent’s current shock or history. 
A bank’s objective is to maximize expected utility of its depositors, subject to several 
constraints.  First, we have the balance sheet constraint faced by the bank.  In market 2 of date t, 
each agent deposits 1td  general goods in a bank, and the bank does three things with these 
goods.  Per depositor, the amount 1tk is allocated to investment in capital formation.  The 
transaction costs borne by buyers who make withdrawals in market 1 are resource costs of 
operating banks.  Therefore, the bank must set goods aside to cover the operating costs in market 
1 of date 1t .  Per depositor, this amount is 1tl , given by 
(6)    it
HLi
i
tl 1
,
1 12 

    
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Clearly, 01 tl  if there are no withdrawals ( 11 
i
t , HLi , ).  Finally, denote by 1tZ  the 
nominal amount of reserves of money needed per depositor to meet withdrawal demand in 
market 1 of 1t .  Letting 
1,2
1
1


 
t
t
t p
Z
z , the bank must allocate 11  ttz   of deposits to 
acquiring reserves on date t, in order to have real balances of 1tz  in market 1 of date 1t .  
Hence, the balance sheet constraint of a bank is 
(7)  11111   ttttt zlkd   . 
Second, a bank’s real money balances in market 1 on date t + 1 must be sufficient to pay interest 
at the rate 1,1 tr  on withdrawals in market 1: 
(8)       

  11
,
1,11 2
1 t
i
t
HLi
i
tt dgrz  . 
In market 1, interest is paid only on the fraction itg 1  of the buyer’s deposit (net of the 
transaction cost) that he withdraws.  This constraint assumes banks do not carry reserves from 
market 1 to market 2.  At inflation rates above the Friedman rule, this assumption holds because 
the opportunity cost of holding money balances is positive, and at the Friedman rule, it is without 
loss of generality. 
 Third, a bank’s capital income must be sufficient to pay interest at the rate 1,2 tr  on 
deposits kept until market 2 of date 1t .  This constraint is 
(9)       













  


HLi
i
tt
i
t
i
tttt dgdrk
,
1111,211 122
11    . 
 13 
The real value of a unit of capital, 1t , is its marginal product on date 1t .  Sellers and idle 
agents have intact deposits (
2
1

  of agents).  Buyers, whose proportions are i
2
 ( HLi , ), 
have the fractions itg 11   of their deposits remaining (net of the transaction cost, for buyers 
who made withdrawals in market 1).  Depositors who withdraw in market 2 are residual 
claimants on the bank. 
2.D  Production and market clearing in market 2 
 In market 2 on date t, real per capita output of the general good is given by 
(10)   ttt khfy ,2  
where th2  is per capita labor input, tk  is the per capita capital stock, and f is a constant returns 
to scale production technology employed by competitive firms.  Per capita labor input is given 
by 
      nt
HLi
i
st
i
btt hhhh 2
,
222 12
  

 . 
 Factor markets are competitive, and we can think of wages and rent on capital as being 
paid in the general good.  This gives us the standard factor pricing relationships 
(11)  
 
t
tt
t k
khf



,2      and     
 
t
tt
t h
khf
w
2
2 ,


  . 
 Goods market clearing in market 2 requires 
(12)  tttt xlky 211    
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where tx2  is per capita consumption in market 2 (a weighted average, defined analogously to 
th2 ). 
 The per capita nominal money supply at the beginning of date t , denoted ,tM  is held as 
money balances tM by agents, and as reserves tZ  by banks.  Dividing by tp2 , the money 
market clearing condition in real terms is ttt zmm  .  The constant gross rate of growth of the 
money supply is 0 .  We focus on stationary monetary economies, where mmm tt  1  and 
zzz tt  1 , and therefore   .  As described earlier, the money stock changes via lump 
sum transfers to agents in market 2.  The real per capita money transfer is given by 
 1  tt m , which, in a stationary allocation, becomes 
(13)    1  zm . 
3   The planner’s allocation 
A brief discussion of the planner’s problem is useful at this point, for two reasons.  One is to 
motivate our focus on stationary equilibrium, and the other is to describe the efficient allocation 
as a reference against which to compare monetary allocations. 
 The planner’s problem is to choose non-negative Htx1 , 
L
tx1 , tx2 , th2 , and tk , for all t, to 
solve 
         

  








0
22
,
112
max
t
tt
HLi
i
t
i
t
iit hxUxcxu   
subject to   122 ,  tttt kkhfx  and   ttt khfk ,,0 21 .  This problem separates into two 
problems, one static and the other dynamic.  The static problem is to maximize the surplus of 
matches in market 1: 
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    tHLixcxu ititi
xit


,,)()(max 11
01
. 
The solution *11
ii xx   is time-invariant, and satisfies )()( *1
*
1
iii xcxu  , with 0*1
*
1 
LH xx .  
The dynamic problem is 
     





 0
212
0,0
,max
12 t
tttt
t
kh
hkkhfU
tt
  
subject to   ttt khfk ,,0 21 , which has first-order conditions: 
      01,22 2  ttht khfxU  
        0, 11,21,22   ttktt khfxUxU  . 
In stationary equilibrium,  

1
,2 khfk ,   ),(
1
2
2
2
khf
xU
h
 , and   kkhfx  ,22 .  These 
three equations imply unique solutions for 2x , 2h , and k, and that the rate of return on capital is 
 /1 . 
4   Agents’ optimization problems in market 1 
A seller matched with a buyer of type HLi ,  chooses 01 tih to solve 
      ististit dmWhc ,max 1  . 
To obtain  istist dmW , , use i sth2 from (5), and istm  and istd  from (3)-(4).  Imposing market-
clearing yields 
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2
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1
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The seller’s problem then becomes 







tt
i
t
i
ti
t
x wp
xp
xc
i
t 2
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1
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)(max
1
, with first-order condition 
(14)    0
2
1
1 
tt
i
ti
t wp
p
xc . 
A buyer of type HLi ,  chooses 01 
i
tx and 
i
tg  to solve 
      ibtibtiti dmWxu ,max 1   
subject to (1)-(2), where 
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The multipliers associated with the two constraints in (2) are igt  and 
i
gt  ( HLi , ).  Since (1) 
may bind, the first-order condition for the choice of itx1  is 
(15)   
t
i
t
i
i
t
t
w
xu
p
p 1
1
1
2   
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where the left-hand side gives the marginal utility of expenditure.  Substituting (14) into (15) 
yields 
(16)  1
)(
)(
1
1 


i
t
i
t
i
xc
xu
 . 
From (16) and the definition of *1
ix we immediately have the following lemma. 
Lemma 1:  If (1) does not bind, then *11
ii
t xx   ( HLi , ). 
 Using (16), the first-order conditions for itg  ( HLi , ) can be written as 
(17)      01
)(
)(
1 12
1
1
1 








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
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
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gttti
t
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t
i
t
t
t rr
xc
xu
r
w
d
. 
Intuitively, if 0 , agents do not carry money into market 1, and going into market 1, all 
money will be held by banks as reserves.  However, if 0 , then the magnitudes of   and π 
determine which buyers (if any) make withdrawals from their deposits, and in what amounts 
(regardless of whether or not agents carry money into market 1).  At this point we consider 
stationary allocations in which H buyers, at least, and possibly all buyers, make withdrawals in 
market 1.  I.e., we consider stationary allocations in which 10  HL gg , and some or all 
money is held by banks as reserves.  It is intuitive that HL gg  , or equivalently, that LH xx 11  , 
and this will be verified in equilibrium.  From inspection of (17) we have the following Lemma. 
Lemma 2:  In a stationary allocation in which 10  HL gg  
(18)  
)(
)(
1
1
)(
)(
1
1
1
2
1
1
H
HH
L
LL
xc
xu
r
r
xc
xu

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





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where the first inequality is strict iff 0Lg  binds, and the second inequality is strict iff 1Hg  
binds. 
 The multiplier 
H
g  gives the value of relaxing the constraint that in market 1, an H 
buyer’s withdrawal is limited to his deposit (minus , i.e., he cannot borrow.  The multiplier Lg  
gives the value of relaxing the constraint that an L buyer cannot lend.  Whether buyers’ 
consumption levels in market 1 are efficient depends on whether these constraints bind, which in 
turn depends on 1,1 tr  and 1,2 tr . 
5   Agents’ optimization problem in market 2 
 Using (5) in  ijtijt dmW , , we have 
 
       
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



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t
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i
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t
t
t
i
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i
jt dmVw
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w
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w
x
xUdmW
tt


.  
The first-order condition with respect to i jtx2  implies that the optimal level of consumption in 
market 2 depends on the wage, and is the same for all agents: 
(19)    ti jt
t
i
jt xxw
xU 222
1
    sbnj ,, ; HLi , . 
Now consider an agent’s choices of 01 tm  and 01 td .  The value function V is 
differentiable (see Aliprantis, Camera, and Ruscitti, 2009, for a proof), and therefore the first-
order conditions are 
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where 0mt  and 0dt  are multipliers on the non-negativity constraints on m and d.  
Writing  ijtijt dmW ,  as 
       
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0,0,
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we have 
(21) 
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Using (3)-(4) in (21) yields 
(22)
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The second and third terms give wealth at date t, inclusive of the money transfer and the return 
on deposits left intact until market 2.  The fourth term gives the return on deposits withdrawn in 
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market 1.  The last term is the expected surplus from trade in market 1.  If (1) is binding, then 
using (14), and 
i
t
t
t
i
t
p
p
m
x
1
21 


 from (1), we have 
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Using this in (20), the Euler equation for m in a stationary allocation is 
(23)  m
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Since the term in square brackets is non-negative (see (16)), a standard result immediately 
follows. 
Lemma 3:     must hold in any stationary allocation with 0m .  If   , then *11
ii xx   
(i= H, L). 
 From (14), and conjecturing that (1) is binding, we have  
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Using this in (20), the Euler equation for d in a stationary allocation is 
(24)      d
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Since 0d  when 0d , Lemmas 1 and 2 immediately imply the following. 
Lemma 4:  In a stationary allocation with 0d , *11
ii xx  , HLi ,  iff /111 21  rr . 
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Definition:  A stationary equilibrium is a set of time-invariant quantities ( ix1 ,
i
jx2 , 
ih1 , 
i
jh2 , and 
y), prices ( ip1 , 2p , w ,  , 1r , and 2r ), and asset holdings (
i
jm , 
i
jd , m, d, z, k, and l), sbnj ,, , 
and HLi , , that solve agents’, banks’, and firms’ maximization problems, and clear all markets 
(goods, money, capital, and labor) on all dates.  In particular, agents’ first-order conditions (14), 
(15), (17), (19), and (20); the factor-pricing relationships (11); the market-clearing conditions 
(12), (13), and ii hx 11  ; and banks’ resource constraints (7), (8), and (9) must be satisfied in 
every period. 
6   No withdrawals of deposits in market 1 (large  ) 
 We first look at the benchmark case where the transaction cost   is so large that buyers 
do not make withdrawals in market 1.  In this case, banks hold no monetary reserves.  Banks 
invest all deposits in capital formation, and the equilibrium allocation is equivalent to one 
without banks, in which agents make direct use of the investment technology.  The allocation is 
similar to that in Aruoba and Wright (2003), the key difference being that heterogeneity in 
market 1 implies consumption of L buyers may be unconstrained if inflation is sufficiently low. 
To see this, consider a stationary equilibrium with 0, dm  and 0ig  for HLi , .  
From (24),  /11 2  r .  It follows that the allocation in market 2 corresponds to the planner’s 
allocation, because banks’ resource constraint is now  21 rdk  , and the balance sheet 
constraint becomes kd  , implying  /1 .  However, in market 1, buyers’ consumption 
levels depend on π, and from Lemma 3, buyers’ consumption is efficient only at the Friedman 
rule (   ).  
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To study the allocation at higher inflation rates note that efficient consumption differs 
across buyers’ types (Lemma 1).  At the Friedman rule, L and H buyers leave market 1 with 
different money balances, because they both enter market 1 with money balances equal to m, but 
their expenditure differs.  Since *1
*
1
LH xx  , there is a range of inflation rates at which 
*
11
HH xx   and *11
LL xx  .  To find this range, note that if *11
LL xx  , then using (23), Hx1 solves 
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Using 0itg , (1) becomes 
(25)   ii xcxwm 11   
if buyer i is constrained.  If   , then (25) must hold for H buyers, at least.  Clearly, as π rises, 
Hx1  falls and m falls (w is unaffected), until 
*  , where 
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.  If *  , L 
buyers are also constrained.  Then (25) holds for both H and L buyers, implying 111 xxx
LH  , 
since all agents bring m into market 1.  To derive * , note that (23) becomes 
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We can solve for 
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and then  we substitute the result into (23).  Note that *  increases with LH   , and  *  
as LH   ; without heterogeneity, consumption of buyers is unconstrained only at the 
Friedman rule. 
7   No transaction costs ( 0 ) 
 Now bank deposits dominate money in the portfolio carried by agents from one period to 
the next, since money can be withdrawn at no cost in market 1.  The entire money supply is held 
by banks as reserves, to meet withdrawal demand during decentralized trade.  Remaining bank 
assets are held as capital investment, on behalf of agents who hold deposits into market 2.  
Clearly, banks eliminate unused money balances, which increases the return on agents’ saving, 
and improves welfare, except at the Friedman rule. 
To derive the equilibrium allocation, note that banks’ constraint giving feasible 
combinations of 1r  and 2r  is obtained using (6)-(9).  When 0 , (6) implies 0l , and (7) 
becomes zkd  .   (8) becomes 
    dgrz
LHi
ii


,
1 2
1  , 
and therefore (9) can be written as  
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 24 
 At the Friedman rule , (23) requires *11
ii
t xx  , HLi , , and Lemma 2 implies 21 rr  .  
(24) becomes /11 2  r , implying /11 1  r  as well.  Substitution into (26) yields 
 /1 .  Thus, the first-order conditions and constraint faced by the planner are replicated, and 
the planner’s allocations in both markets are replicated, by the deposit contract 
/111 21  rr .  But at the Friedman rule, agents can alternatively achieve the efficient 
allocation by carrying money balances and using the investment technology directly (see (23) 
when   ).  When nominal interest rates are zero, there is no opportunity cost of holding idle 
money balances, and therefore, trading frictions do not create distortions. 
We now show that banks improve welfare for   , proceeding in two steps.  First, we 
show the existence of a deposit contract that supports a welfare-superior allocation compared to 
an economy without banks.  This contract is given by /11 1  r  and /11 2  r .  The 
corresponding allocation is the allocation that would be achieved if agents knew the realizations 
of their type shocks when choosing their savings.  Second, we show this deposit contract is 
optimal in the sense that banks cannot find an alternative contract that achieves a superior 
allocation in market 1. 
Lemma 5:  In stationary equilibrium, the deposit contract /11 1  r  and /11 2  r  supports 
an allocation characterized by  /1 , 0 md , and 





)(
)(
1
1
i
ii
xc
xu
, HLi , .  This allocation 
is superior to an allocation without banks. 
Proof of Lemma 5:  Suppose banks offer the contract /11 1  r  and /11 2  r .  Conjecture 
that this contract leads to an equilibrium in which agents carry deposits, but no money, into 
market 1 ( 0 md ). 
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First, we check that the contract is feasible.  /11 1  r  is simply the gross real rate of 
return on reserves of money.  Hence, banks certainly can offer this return on withdrawals in 
market 1.  /11 2  r  is the gross real rate of return on capital, and so banks can offer this 
return on withdrawals in market 2.  By (26), if /11 1  r , then  21 r , implying  /1 . 
Second, we check that 0d and 0m  are optimal, i.e., agents prefer to save entirely in 
the form of bank deposits.  Start by conjecturing that 0d .  This means (24) must hold 
with 0d .  Substituting /11 2  r  and /11 1  r  into (24), we note that (24) holds 
with 0d if 
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, also.  This means all 
buyers’ withdrawals in market 1 are unconstrained; given the deposit contract, buyers are 
indifferent between withdrawing and spending an additional dollar in market 1, and leaving that 
marginal dollar in the bank until market 2.  Now we prove that 0m  is optimal by developing a 
contradiction.  Suppose 0m .  This would imply (23) holds with 0m .  (23) implies 
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which, in turn, implies 0m , giving us the desired contradiction. 
Third, we must check that the deposit contract being considered improves the allocation relative 
to an economy without banks.  The allocation in market 2 is efficient since  /1 , as in the 
solution to the planner’s problem.   Consider market 1.  In the economy without banks, prior 
knowledge of the realization of agents’ type shocks would improve the allocation.  This would 
allow agents who will be sellers and idle next period to hold no money, and it would allow 
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agents who will be H buyers in market 1 to save more money than agents who will be L buyers.  
Buyers would equate the discounted marginal utility of holding a dollar to the cost of acquiring 
the dollar, leading them to acquire money so that a deterministic version of the Euler equation 
(23) holds, i.e., 
)(
)(
1
1
1
i
ii
xc
xu




 , HLi , .  Sellers and idle agents would invest in capital 
formation such that the discounted marginal return equals the cost (one), i.e.,  /1 .  Thus, all 
money would be held by (future) buyers, and in the optimal ratio across H and L buyers.  
Similarly, in the allocation with banks offering the proposed deposit contract, all money ends up 
in the hands of market 1 buyers (only buyers make withdrawals). Money balances of H and L 
buyers will be in the ratio buyers would have chosen if they had known their type shocks in 
advance, since 





1
2
1
1
r
r
 is necessary and sufficient to attain this allocation. 
Finally, we show that this contract is the best banks can offer.  Start by noting that banks 
should not liquidate capital investment to meet redemption demand in market 1, because buyers 
cannot consume the proceeds, and the proceeds cannot be used as a medium of exchange in 
market 1 (money is essential for exchange in market 1).  This means banks must meet 
redemption demand in market 1 with money.  In addition, banks should hold reserves of money 
only in the amount demanded by buyers, since holding money from one period to the next carries 
an opportunity cost.  Letting iz denote per capita real balances available to meet withdrawal 
demand by buyers of type i, HLi , , we see that 


LHi
ii zz
,
2
 gives total reserves (real 
balances) banks must hold.  Banks choose reserves optimally, to maximize utility of market 1 
buyers, given buyers’ budget constraints, i.e., banks choose 0iz , HLi ,  to maximize 
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This implies the deposit contract must satisfy /11 1  r  and /11 2  r  because (i) if 
/11 1  r , then by (26) we must have /11 2  r  (and 




1
2
1
1
r
r
) and (ii) if /11 1  r , 
then 0m , which is suboptimal.  □ 
The contract /11 1  r  and /11 2  r  is feasible because it pays the return on 
money in market 1, and the marginal product of capital in market 2.  It improves the allocation, 
relative to an economy without banks, because banks pool liquidity and redistribute it, in market 
1, to agents who need it to consume.  The contract is optimal, but it provides only partial 
insurance against consumption risk.  The insurance is partial because although banks can 
reallocate existing liquidity, they cannot create liquidity beyond the reserves of money that they 
hold.  This is prevented by the same informational and enforcement frictions that make money 
essential for trade in market 1.  The contract is optimal as no other feasible deposit contract can 
be offered that yields higher expected utility for depositors. 
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Higher expected utility would result from a contract that did more than reallocate existing 
liquidity.  Such a contract would increase the real rate of return in market 1, i.e., /11 1  r .  
Doing this would require banks either to create money, or to deliver consumption directly to 
buyers (as in consumption loans).  Neither is a possibility in this model.  This limits the role of 
banks to reallocating liquidity, which is unlike the allocative role played by banks in the non-
monetary banking model in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), where liquidated investment can be 
directly consumed. 
In sum, even if banks have limited information and enforcement abilities, their provision 
of liquidity insurance improves the allocation, away from the Friedman rule.  However, the 
efficient allocation remains out of reach because banks cannot create money.  This raises the 
question of whether there is a role for central bank injections of money into banks in market 1, 
through a policy of paying interest on reserves.  This possibility is explored next. 
8  Interest on reserves when transaction costs are zero 
 When the central bank pays interest on reserves, the set of resource constraints facing 
banks is altered, allowing banks to pay a higher nominal interest rate on deposits withdrawn in 
market 1.  Define Zr  as the net real interest rate paid on reserves in market 1.  The balance sheet 
constraint does not change (see the previous section).  However, (8), which is the resource 
constraint for meeting demand for redemptions in market 1, becomes 
      dg rrz
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ii
Z 

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2
11 1 . 
Now (26), which links 1r  and 2r , becomes 
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 Suppose the central bank attempts to increase consumption in market 1 for all buyers, 
without distorting consumption in market 2.  In other words, suppose values for 1r  and 2r  are 
chosen to loosen the constraints on market 1 consumption, while maintaining the equilibrium 
condition that 
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, HLi , .  Using the fact that /11 2  r  (from the Euler 
equation for deposits), and recalling that  /1  (from the planner’s problem), (27) implies 
(28)  
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whereas (26) implied /11 1  r .  The central bank can set Zr  to manipulate 1r .  Any value of 
1r  such that 





1
2
1
1
1
r
r
 improves the allocation in market 1, compared to the allocation in 
Lemma 5.  The efficient allocation in market 1 requires /111 21  rr  (by Lemma 4).  
Using (28), this requires  /1  Zr . 
 Why does a policy of paying interest on reserves work?  The real rate of return on money 
is increased to /1 , the rate of return at the Friedman rule.  Each dollar of the money supply 
pays this rate of return, which is then passed on to buyers, because when 0 , no money is held 
outside of banks going into market 1 (so the central bank policy targets the entire money supply), 
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and only buyers make withdrawals.1  Paying interest on reserves does not require the central 
bank or banks themselves to know any information that is private to agents when they make 
withdrawals (realizations of type shocks), and it is incentive compatible.  As long as 12 rr  , 
sellers and idle agents do not make withdrawals in market 1, and L buyers have no incentive to 
withdraw more than is needed to purchase the efficient quantity in market 1.  By taking 
advantage of the liquidity insurance mechanism implemented by banks, a policy of paying 
interest on reserves effectively allows the central bank to undo the distortionary effects of 
inflation by taxing agents in market 2 (a negative money transfer), and this policy can be 
executed at any inflation rate.2 
 To find the real money transfer required by a central bank policy of paying interest on 
reserves, consider the money market clearing condition.  In stationary equilibrium, banks receive 
a transfer of real balances equal to zrZ  at the beginning of market 1 (net interest on reserves), 
while agents receive a transfer of real balances equal to   in market 2.  Recall that the change in 
aggregate real balances is  1m  in stationary equilibrium.  Thus, in each period, 
 1  mzrZ .  Using  /1  Zr  and mz  (banks hold the entire money supply), the 
money transfer in the efficient allocation is a tax given by 

 )1(  z . 
9   Positive transaction costs ( 0 ) 
 The assumption that resources are required to operate banks that can be accessed in 
decentralized markets is consistent with the frictions characterizing such markets.  In this model, 
                                                 
1 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation, and for providing helpful comments on an 
earlier version of this section. 
2 If money transfers are restricted to be non-negative, because of enforcement issues, then the efficient allocation 
cannot be achieved. One way to bypass such enforcement issues, and to achieve a result similar to paying interest on 
reserves, would be to sell interest-paying government bonds that can be liquidated, at a cost, in market 1 (Boel and 
Camera, 2006). 
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a stationary equilibrium when transactions costs are positive will be one of three possible types, 
depending on the values of  and . 
 If bank operating costs (transaction costs) are sufficiently small (relative to inflation), 
agents carry no money balances into market 1, and all buyers in market 1 withdraw the money 
they need to undertake their purchases (region (i) in Figure 1).  These stationary equilibria 
closely resemble the stationary equilibrium when 0 .  If transaction costs are moderate, then 
agents carry money into market 1, and only H buyers make withdrawals (region (ii) in Figure 1).  
Here agents undertake a combination of self-insurance and utilization of banks’ ability to 
reallocate liquidity.  Finally, if transaction costs are sufficiently large, then the liquidity 
insurance provided by banks is too costly to utilize, so agents carry money into market 1, and do 
not make withdrawals (region (iii) in Figure 1).  In the following subsections we derive the 
equilibrium allocations in the regions (i) and (ii), and conditions for the boundaries between 
regions.  (Region (iii) was covered in section 6.) 
9.A  Small transaction costs 
  For any   , there is an interval of values of  that are sufficiently small for expected 
utility still to be maximized when agents deposit all of their saving in banks.  To derive the 
allocation in this case, we conjecture the existence of a stationary equilibrium in which agents 
hold deposits, but no money, going into market 1, and all buyers make withdrawals in market 1 
( 10  HL gg ).  Clearly, the constraint 0Lg  cannot be binding, or L buyers would not 
consume in market 1.  The constraint 1Hg  is not binding either; if it were, agents could 
increase the amount they deposit in market 2, and be better off.  Since neither constraint is 
binding, Lemma 2 implies 
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, HLi , .  The logic that is the basis for the proof of 
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Lemma 5 continues to hold, and therefore, the allocation in market 1 is the same as when 0 , 
characterized by 





)(
)(
1
1
i
ii
xc
xu
, HLi , , and  /1 .  This allocation is sustained by a deposit  
 
 
 
 
contract offering /11 2  r  and /11 1  r .  To show that this deposit contract and the 
allocation in market 1 are consistent with banks’ constraints, note that transaction costs incurred 
making withdrawals in market 1 are 
2
l  on a per capita basis, and (26) becomes 
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Clearly  21 r  iff /11 1  r .  However, because of these real operating costs of banks, the 
allocation in market 2 is less efficient than when 0 . 
 We can infer various features of the equilibrium allocation.  Since ix1  is determined by 



)(
)(
1
1
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ii
xc
xu
, HLi , , consumption in market 1 is the same as when 0 .  Withdrawals in 
market 1 are the same, and since 1r  is the same, bank reserves z are the same.  Banks’ balance 
sheet constraint is 
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where k, w, Hx1 and 
Lx1  are known, allowing d to be calculated.  Using d, the equilibrium 
fractions of deposits withdrawn ( ig , HLi , ) may be calculated from (25).  With constant 
returns to scale production in market 2,  /1  only if k and 2h (and therefore y) change in the 
same proportion, as   increases.  Therefore, w remains unchanged, and from (19), 2x  remains 
unchanged.  Average hours  ( 2h ) increase, because agents must work more in order to maintain 
larger deposits.  Deposits are larger, because a fraction of deposits is dissipated in bank operating 
costs. 
9.B  Moderate transaction costs 
Once the transaction cost exceeds a threshold (which depends on the inflation rate, and is derived 
later), the expected utility-maximizing deposit contract induces some buyers to incur the 
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transaction cost, but not all.  Banks can still increase expected utility by redistributing liquidity, 
but the increase is more limited.  Agents carry money into market 1, in addition to deposits, and 
only H buyers, who value consumption in market 1 more, make withdrawals in market 1. 
In an equilibrium in which agents carry both money and deposits into market 1, but only 
H buyers make withdrawals, the incentives for L buyers to make withdrawals from their deposits 
must be sufficiently weak (as must those of sellers and idle agents).  For this reason, the expected 
utility-maximizing contract offered by banks must be quite different than when the transaction 
cost is zero or small.  Specifically, this contract will have (i) /11 1  r , so agents who spend a 
small amount will be content to have carried money balances for this purpose, (ii) 
12 1/11 rr   , so there is no incentive to withdraw deposits in market 1 unless the money 
will be used to buy goods in market 1, and (iii) a ceiling on deposit size ( dd  ), to ensure agents 
do not overinvest in capital.  Then 0m  equals equilibrium expenditure by L buyers (who do 
not make withdrawals), and 0 dd  is determined by the amount of additional money H 
buyers need as a supplement to m. 
 We are looking for a stationary equilibrium in which L buyers make no withdrawals in 
market 1, while H buyers withdraw and spend their entire deposit, and banks offer a deposit 
contract such that these withdrawal decisions are unconstrained (implying total surplus from 
trades in market 1 is maximized).  I.e., the equilibrium we seek to characterize has 0Lg  and 
1Hg , and 
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, HLi , , from Lemma 2.  For H buyers, this is achieved by 
setting the maximum deposit size d  such that the constraint 1Hg  is “just” binding.  Note that 
since agents can make direct use of the investment technology (agents can undertake investment 
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outside of banks), there need be no utility cost of a deposit ceiling.  For L buyers, the constraint 
0Lg  is also “just” binding; L buyers spend all money they carry into market 1 (otherwise, 
they would want to redeposit some of it). 
When 0Lg  and 1Hg , buyers’ budget constraints are   
t
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p
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The right-hand-side of (29) must be positive, and hence, Hx1 > 
Lx1 , where 
Lx1  is pinned down by 
m, and Hx1  is pinned down by the deposit ceiling, d . 
 Briefly, this deposit contract allows banks still to deliver some benefits from reallocating 
liquidity.  A gap between the marginal utilities of consumption of H and L buyers is necessary 
for region (ii) to exist; as LH   , region (ii) disappears, because the strategy of this deposit 
contract to reduce transaction costs—inducing buyers who value consumption in market 1 less to 
use money balances only—breaks down. 
 To see why banks need to set a deposit ceiling, note that in equilibrium, (23) must hold 
with 0m .  Using 
1
2
1
1
1
1
)(
)(
r
r
xc
xu
i
ii





, (23) becomes 
    











 1
2
111 12 

rr , 
which implies 12 rr  .  Banks’ constraints (7)-(9) yield 
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(30)  
   

















 





2
1
2
1
21
1
2
d
drd
r . 
Recall that we need /11 1  r  in order to discourage L buyers from withdrawing deposits.  
(30) then implies  21 r .  The Euler equation for the amount agents invest directly in capital 
formation (unintermediated investment) implies that  /1  in equilibrium.  The Euler 
equation for deposits, (24), becomes /11 2  r , indicating that agents want an infinite amount 
of deposits, which cannot be an equilibrium.  Hence, banks must set a maximum deposit size.  
Capital created by agents directly has the lower rate of return,  /1 , and is determined as the 
difference between the equilibrium level of k and capital investment by banks. 
 From goods market-clearing, clearly k and y are smaller in region (ii) than in region (i) (at 
the boundary).  Intuitively, the levels of k and y that need to be maintained in region (ii) are 
smaller, because fewer resources are being used up in transaction costs.  From banks’ balance 
sheet constraint, d is also smaller in region (ii).  Deposits are smaller because each of reserves, 
resources set aside to cover transaction costs, and the capital stock is smaller.  
9.C  Relationship between threshold values of the transaction cost and inflation 
Now we characterize the boundaries between regions (i) and (ii), and regions (ii) and (iii).  As 
we know from our analysis of stationary equilibrium in these regions, one possible type of 
equilibrium involves all buyers bearing the cost of making withdrawals in market 1, which 
allows agents to pool all of their saving in market 2, and to take full advantage of banks’ ability 
to reallocate liquidity.  In a second possible type of equilibrium, all agents carry some money 
balances into market 1—in the amount L buyers will require for their purchases—but H buyers 
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bear the cost of making withdrawals in market 1.  Banks reduce but do not eliminate idle money 
balances.  The third possibility is that no one is willing to incur the cost of withdrawing money in 
market 1, and all agents carry money balances into market 1, sufficient for self-insurance against 
the type shock. 
  Given parameters of the model, the value function can be evaluated for all three types of 
equilibria.  The boundary between regions (i) and (ii) is derived by equating the value function 
for the first type of equilibrium, and the value function for the second type of equilibrium.  On 
this boundary, lifetime utilities are equal in the two types of equilibria.  The boundary condition 
can be solved for the magnitude of the transaction cost, as a function of the inflation rate, given 
all other parameters.  Similarly, the boundary between regions (ii) and (iii) is derived from the 
value functions for the second and third types of equilibria. 
Using (21) and (22), the value function in stationary equilibrium is given by 
(31) 
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where   is given by (13). 
 In region (i), 0m , and 10  HL gg .  Using banks’ constraints (7)-(9), (31) 
becomes 
                






LHi
iiiiLHLH xcxu
ww
k
w
x
xUdmVdmV
, 11
2
2
,,
22
1
,, . 
In region (ii), 0m , 0Lg , and 1Hg .  Again using banks’ constraints, (31) becomes 
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At the boundary between regions (i) and (ii), LHV , = HV .  We know the values of 2x  , w, and   
are the same in regions (i) and (ii) (given values of all parameters other than  , including  ), 
but Hx1 , 
Lx1 , and k are different.  Therefore 
HLH VV ,  becomes 
(32) 
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where LHk ,  and Hk  are the equilibrium values of capital in regions (i) and (ii), respectively, 
and      LHiii xcxu ,11   and     Hiii xcxu 11  , HLi , , give match surpluses in regions (i) and 
(ii), respectively.  We know HLH kk ,  at the boundary, and that Hx1  and 
Lx1 are larger in 
region (i) than in (ii), allowing us to conclude that          HiiiLHiii xcxuxcxu 11,11  , 
HLi , .  Since Lx1  is a function of  , this condition gives the threshold value of  as a function 
of  .  Both H and L buyers become more constrained as  /  rises, in both regions (i) and (ii).  
However, they become more constrained at different rates—they become more constrained faster 
in region (ii).  I.e., in both regions, match surpluses decline as  /  rises, but they decline faster 
in region (ii).  Since inflation has no effect on k, the left-hand-side of (32) increases as  /  
rises, and therefore the threshold size of   increases, on the right-hand-side.  This gives us the 
positively-sloped boundary between regions (i) and (ii) in Figure 1. 
 In region (iii), the value function is given by 
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Using the banks’ constraints we obtain 
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The condition defining the boundary between regions (ii) and (iii) is AH VV  : 
(33)  
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where Ak  is the capital stock in region (iii), and     AHHH xcxu 11   and     ALLL xcxu 11   are 
the match surpluses of H and L buyers, respectively, in region (iii).  Recall, that in region (iii), 
Hx1  and 
Lx1  must be calculated differently depending upon whether the inflation rate is below or 
above the value * .  When inflation is “high,” and  /  rises, both H and L buyers become 
more constrained faster in region (iii) than in region (ii); match surpluses in both regions decline, 
but they decline faster in region (iii).  We know AH kk  , and inflation has no effect on k within 
either region.  Therefore, the left-hand-side of (33) increases as  /  rises, and the threshold 
size of   increases, resulting in a positively-sloped boundary between regions (ii) and (iii) in 
Figure 1.  When inflation is “intermediate,” the weighted average of 
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i
ii
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
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 is the same for H 
and L buyers in the two regions (at a value set by the Euler equation for m).  This weighted 
average is increasing in the inflation rate, and therefore, the wedge between how constrained H 
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and L buyers are, in region (iii), is increasing in the inflation rate.  With the assumptions we have 
made on u and c, it is also true at “intermediate” inflation rates that match surpluses decline 
faster in region (iii) than in region (ii).  Therefore, the boundary between regions (ii) and (iii) is 
positively-sloped in this case also. 
9.D  Interest on reserves when transaction costs are positive 
In region (i), where   is small, a policy of paying interest on reserves has the same potential to 
improve the allocation in market 1 as when 0 .  It is easy to show that if Zr  is chosen as in 
the case where 0 , interest on reserves allows unconstrained consumption by all buyers in 
market 1 (and that the Euler equations for deposits and money are both satisfied).  However, as 
discussed earlier, the resources expended as bank operating costs (transaction costs) alter the 
allocation in market 2. 
 In region (ii), consumption in market 1 is pinned down by the Euler equation for m, (23).  
A policy of paying interests on reserves does not change the allocation when H buyers but not L 
buyers make withdrawals, because the deposit contract requires the rate of return on deposits 
withdrawn in market 1 to be inferior to the rate of return on money.  If this were not the case, 
then L buyers would also make withdrawals in market 1 (and bring no money into market 1).  
Although a policy of paying interest on reserves cannot affect the allocation, it shifts the 
boundary between regions (i) and (ii).  The size of region (i) increases, at the expense of region 
(ii), i.e., the policy extends the range values of  for which the net benefits of the liquidity 
insurance implemented by banks are positive. 
10  Conclusion 
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We have constructed a model of banking in which demand deposit contracts, which allow the 
timing of withdrawals to respond to random shocks to trading opportunities and preferences, 
improve the equilibrium allocation.  The potential for banks to improve the allocation arises 
when banks can reallocate liquidity to those who randomly need it, thereby reducing or 
eliminating idle money balances, and shifting the composition of saving toward capital 
formation, which has a higher return.  One main contribution of the paper is to explore the 
potential of banks to improve the allocation, even though operating banks in a decentralized 
setting involves resource costs (real transaction costs), and even though banks operate subject to 
limitations on information and enforcement abilities. 
 As bank operating costs (transaction costs) rise, banks change the nature of the deposit 
contract they offer, in order to dampen some depositors’ incentives to make early withdrawals, 
while continuing to reallocate liquidity to those who need it most.  The potential of banks to 
improve the allocation is diminished as transaction costs rise, and at some point, it is eliminated.  
The higher is the inflation rate, the greater is the value to depositors of the reallocation of 
liquidity implemented by a demand deposit contract, and the larger are the transaction costs 
agents are willing to incur to have the benefit of access to banks (up to some prohibitive level of 
costs).  A relationship between inflation and the terms of the demand deposit contract exists 
because, with our assumptions about limited information and enforcement, banks cannot create 
money, and they cannot set up consumption loans.  Thus, although banks can improve the 
allocation (except at the Friedman rule), banks cannot implement the efficient allocation. The 
best banks can do is to support the allocation agents would choose if they could perfectly 
anticipate their trading and marginal utility shocks—and banks can do this only if bank operating 
costs are not too large. 
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 Because banks cannot create money, a central bank policy of paying interest on reserves 
(recently implemented by the Federal Reserve) can move the allocation closer to efficiency.  
This policy works regardless of the inflation rate, without the government or banks needing 
information about liquidity needs of individual agents, and without any enforcement issues 
arising, because the demand deposit contract is incentive compatible.  However, it works only 
when transaction costs are sufficiently small that the deposit contract can completely eliminate 
idle money balances (all money is held by banks), because in that case, interest on reserves gives 
money injections in proportion to money holdings.  This result suggests a central bank policy of 
paying interest on reserves should be adopted in countries where operating costs of banks are 
low. 
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